Nurse Gives Lethal Dose of Vecuronium Instead of Versed

On December 26, 2017, a tragic and preventable death occurred when a patient at Vanderbilt Hospital was sent for a Positron Emission Tomography (PET) scan and received a lethal dose of Vecuronium instead of Versed. Nurses General Nursing Article

PET scans are typically performed in the outpatient setting and not inpatient. They are not emergent. This was a full body inpatient PET scan which might be said is inappropriate resource utilization.

If it had been done in the outpatient setting, it's unlikely that Versed would have been administered. Essentially a patient died because a dangerous medication that was never ordered was given.

The patient, a 75 yr old female, was admitted to neuro ICU on 12/24/2017 with intraparenchymal hematoma of the brain, headache, homonymous hemianopia (loss of visual field bilaterally), atrial fib, and hypertension. She was alert and oriented and doing well, about to be transferred to SDU. While the patient was waiting for her scan, she asked for medication to prevent claustrophobia. The provider ordered 2 mg of Versed, and the pt's nurse was asked to come down and administer it.

At the time, the pt's nurse was covering a lunch break for another nurse and asked the "help all nurse" to go down and give the Versed so the procedure would not be delayed or rescheduled. The "help all nurse" performs different tasks, but there was no job description for a "help all nurse". It is not clear if the "help all nurse" was an ICU nurse, or a nurse floated from elsewhere, such as Med Surg. Clearly, the "help all nurse" was not trained in conscious sedation, and was seemingly unfamiliar with both Versed and Vecuronium.

The "help all nurse" searched for Versed under the pt's profile in the Pyxis but it did not come up. So she chose override and typed in "VE". The first drug to come up was Vecuronium, which she selected. She then proceeded to reconstitute the drug, not recognizing that Versed does not need to be reconstituted, and not taking heed of the red cap on the vial or the words "paralytic agent". Next, she administered 2 mg of the Vecuronium IVP and left the patient.

Vecuronium and Versed

Vecuronium is a neuromuscular blocking agent that causes paralysis and death if patients are not monitored.

Basically, the patient will be paralyzed, conscious and unable to draw a breath. All sensation will be experienced- panic, pain, fear, but the patient is unable to cry out. It's truly the stuff of nightmares.

Versed is often given for procedural sedation but is not a paralytic. Versed can affect respirations, and patients must be closely monitored for hypoventilation.

Timeline

Here is a timeline of events, where the time was documented.

  • The doctor ordered Versed 2 mg IV at 1447 on 12/26/2017.
  • The Pharmacy reviewed the order at 1449.
  • Vecuronium 10 mg was withdrawn from the Pyxis at 1459 using override.
  • Vecuronium administered but not documented. Patient left alone, unmonitored.
  • Rapid response was called at 1529.
  • Return of spontaneous circulation (ROSC) was restored after 2 rounds of ACLS
  • Patient was intubated and returned to neuro ICU
  • Patient displayed myoclonic jerks with posturing in ICU
  • Anoxic brain injury is documented
  • Extubation was performed at 1257 on 12/27/2017
  • Death was pronounced at 1307 due to pulselessness

The Findings

The Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) did not investigate the event until October, 2018 as the death was not reported to them at the time.

According to CMS standards, patients have a right to receive care in a safe setting and hospitals have a responsibility to mitigate potentially fatal mistakes.

CMS ruled that Vanderbilt failed to provide safe care and protect patients. Vanderbilt was placed in serious and immediate jeopardy by CMS.

Since that ruling, the CMS has accepted Vanderbilt's plan of action.

What Went Wrong

  • No documentation of the Vecuronium being administered
  • Patient was not monitored
  • Autopsy was not conducted as should have been for an unusual death such as one caused by a medication error
  • Death certificate said the cause of death was a cerebral bleed, not a medication error.

Contributing Factors

  • Pyxis override functionality - a necessary function, but contributed to the error
  • Failure of the hospital to ensure that only nurses trained in conscious sedation can administer Versed
  • Failure of hospital policy to address the manner and frequency of monitoring
  • Concern about convenience over safety- pressure to not reschedule a test rather than taking the time to safely prepare the patient
  • Staffing- Covering another nurse's patients results in an unsafe workload

Blaming

The simplest thing is to blame the nurse for 100% of the error. Her failure to follow basic medication safety steps is not defensible.

But stopping there prevents us from learning how it happened and preventing future mistakes. We need to learn more about the science of mistakes. We all make them. Something in our brains allows us to see what we expect to see and not always what is there, as in running a red light. Or not registering red caps and cautionary labels on a high-alert medication.

The "help all nurse" was distracted in that she had an orientee with her, and immediately after giving the medication, went to the ED to perform a swallow screen test. She was performing a series of tasks.

The patient's nurse did not delegate appropriately as she did not confirm the "help all nurses " knowledge and skills. Tasks should be delegated to the right person, and this was not the right nurse to administer Versed. Maybe nurses are not all interchangeable as administrations sometimes like to think.

Vanderbilt did not clearly define role expectations, or patient monitoring in conscious sedation.

What do you think were the causes, and would have prevented this from occurring?

Related post When Nurses Make Fatal Mistakes

Don't get me wrong I am a huge supporter of not blaming nurses for system failures and human error but this goes waaaayyyy beyond that. Frankly, calling this a "mistake" is a misnomer. She made bad, bad, inexcusable choices that resulted in the death of another human. I'm sure she's devastated. She should be. I understand the need for a non-punitive environment when it comes to med errors but jeebus we have to draw the line somewhere.

Understood.

My thing, though, is that these things never occur in a vacuum - and that's not a cliche, it's still a fact and we have chosen to work very hard on some of the safety aspects of our environments while utterly ignoring, downplaying, and even covering up others. Someone has mentioned how much different this was than, say, giving an extra colace. I don't see it that way. The same things that contribute to errors that don't harm anyone contribute to errors that do cause harm. The difference is, if no one is harmed then no entity is publicly forced to correct anything and can get by with focusing on whatever fake fix-all they choose.

If someone did this in my department I would cause a ruckus if no one was willing to talk about: 1) the incentivization of throughput 2) CAHPS/no one can wait 3) the roving/floating/help-all, never-quite-have-enough-help aspect 4) non-experts orienting others 5) contstant orienting 6) utter lack of concern and lack of agenda to effectively accomplish individual nurses' acquisition of expertise 7) literally constant "initiatives" that detract from the bottom line of taking safe care of people 8) technology being taught and advocated out of proportion with other essential concepts and practices, such as all the 5 rights and 3 checks we're all yapping about now. Right up until something baaaad happens, the name of the game is "move." The super fancy accomplishment-tracker EMR that V rolled out in the month before this incident is really good for producing great stats about employees' quick or slow performance.

I feel as though safe practices are in the forefront of my mind. But carrying them out is to swim against the current 100% of the time.

I just got done reading the 56 page CMS report and I have a lot more questions than when I started.

The nurse got the vecoronium out of the neuro ICU pyxis, where the patient was an inpatient. That explains how she had access to it. The bin was labelled as a paralytic that causes respiratory arrest.

She's not sure how much she gave. Maybe 1ml or 1mg.

She brought it down reconstituted in a baggie, gave it to the patient in a holding area. It was only when she gave the excess medication to the patient's primary nurse after the patient was brought back to ICU after the code that the primary nurse noticed it was vec.

The patient was left with just the tech, unmonitored, in a room waiting to go into the scan. Never made it into the scan. This is a patient that came from an ICU and was step down status. These patients are always on monitor at my facility and are transported by an RN, not transport as described in the CMS report. Further in the report it says she was awaiting a floor bed, so that explains this.

The RN was talking to the patient's family when she heard the code called in PET scan. She called PET scan not once but twice to see if it was her patient. She didn't get an answer. Calling an area during a code blue? How lacking in judgement is this person?

She did indeed get fired.

According to the report they don't know how much she gave. Neither syringe was labeled as a med (again, according to report pages 35-36) and I could see it being entirely possible that the med was given as a flush and visa versa.

I

She's not sure how much she gave. Maybe 1ml or 1mg.

She did indeed get fired.

Fired? She's lucky she didn't get prosecuted. And I know I'm going to sound mean but I hope her license was taken away. You can't educate this kind of stupid.

Understood.

My thing, though, is that these things never occur in a vacuum - and that's not a cliche, it's still a fact and we have chosen to work very hard on some of the safety aspects of our environments while utterly ignoring, downplaying, and even covering up others. Someone has mentioned how much different this was than, say, giving an extra colace. I don't see it that way. The same things that contribute to errors that don't harm anyone contribute to errors that do cause harm. The difference is, if no one is harmed then no entity is publicly forced to correct anything and can get by with focusing on whatever fake fix-all they choose.

If someone did this in my department I would cause a ruckus if no one was willing to talk about: 1) the incentivization of throughput 2) CAHPS/no one can wait 3) the roving/floating/help-all, never-quite-have-enough-help aspect 4) non-experts orienting others 5) contstant orienting 6) utter lack of concern and lack of agenda to effectively accomplish individual nurses' acquisition of expertise 7) literally constant "initiatives" that detract from the bottom line of taking safe care of people 8) technology being taught and advocated out of proportion with other essential concepts and practices, such as all the 5 rights and 3 checks we're all yapping about now. Right up until something baaaad happens, the name of the game is "move." The super fancy accomplishment-tracker EMR that V rolled out in the month before this incident is really good for producing great stats about employees' quick or slow performance.

I feel as though safe practices are in the forefront of my mind. But carrying them out is to swim against the current 100% of the time.

The thing is she willfully violated Every. Single. Safety practice that was set in place. Even the most basic (5 rights) precautions that a first year nursing student had drilled into their heads. She can't even remember how much of the med she gave? 1 ml or 1mg? Mixed up generic and trade names and grabbed the first thing that sorta matched? Failed to monitor for response to the medication she thought she gave? Unlabeled syringes? Clearly was unfamiliar with Versed? Administered it in the waiting room? Left an ICU patient unattended? I just don't see how the system failed this nurse. This nurse failed the patient.

Specializes in OB-Gyn/Primary Care/Ambulatory Leadership.

How could she not know how much she gave? That level of sloppiness is really hard for me to wrap my brain around. I mean, setting aside for a moment that she gave the wrong medication - did she not even LOOK at the order? The order was for 2mg Versed. Assuming she thought she had pulled Versed, how is "1 ml or 1 mg" even close to that? I mean, there was no "I gave 2 mg because that's what the order was written for"?

Specializes in Tele, ICU, Staff Development.

It's really clear what the nurse did was unthinkably wrong. But there were also missteps made in staffing and delegation.

Doing a root cause analysis doesn't mean absolving the nurse.

Specializes in OR, Nursing Professional Development.

While I believe that in many cases, the system is the issue, there is just so much wrong here on the individual level. V-E oh I'll grab that med. There was no adherence to the standard nursing practice of the however many rights of medication administration. That's simple nursing 101.

This is just a sad situation of a nurse who was overly confident in her skills and a patient died because of her error. There are of course other factors that went I nto making the situation worse. We as nurses are the first and last defense for our patients and she skipped steps that cost a person their life. I am not sure of the "help all nurse" and what they do but it may be similar to what I know a as resource nurse, which is usually a experienced nurse with years of experience. I would like to know if she floated from another unit? I don't think it's safe when nurses float to areas that are complete out of thier specialty area. Also I don't administer those meds but I know enough to know that the patient should be closely monitored. The most depressing part is that she didn't even look up either medication because she obviously she wasn't familiar with either. I hope the nurse she was training she what happens when you become to complacent and skip steps. Overall, this was a costly mistake but I hope they are able to improve on the overall process.

Maybe it's just me but I see something far more simple.

The nurse pulled a drug that was clearly not the one she was searching for. This wasn't even a case of a similar sounding drug. This was a nurse that tried to find versed, couldn't, and then thought close enough was good enough.

This is an error most new grad nurses wouldn't make.

I agree.

I'm not an acute nurse but regardless whether protocols were in place and/or followed, this nurse couldn't have tried harder to screw up.

There had to be something going with her besides being rushed and working outside her scope.

I think looking for opportunities of improvement are essential but I also think it was as simple as someone practicing with gross incompetence was overlooked. (I think with the fact that she was orienting anyone a hard look at how they are confirming competency is warranted)

The thing is she willfully violated Every. Single. Safety practice that was set in place. Even the most basic (5 rights) precautions that a first year nursing student had drilled into their heads. She can't even remember how much of the med she gave? 1 ml or 1mg? Mixed up generic and trade names and grabbed the first thing that sorta matched? Failed to monitor for response to the medication she thought she gave? Unlabeled syringes? Clearly was unfamiliar with Versed? Administered it in the waiting room? Left an ICU patient unattended? I just don't see how the system failed this nurse. This nurse failed the patient.

Yes.

I have a couple of thoughts - such as my assumption that she diluted the 10 mg vec powder with diluent to a concentration of 1:1; thus it's the same. When asked one time she said "mg," when asked another time she said "ml" (if that's by chance true, none of it explains the failure to give the ordered dose, 2 mg). The administration in radiology waiting area and the failure to monitor is problematic from both sides. Why? Because the best answer here (IMO) would've been to have them go ahead and bring the patient back upstairs. What a ruckus that would've caused! Second best would've been to drag monitoring equipment down there, drag a WOW/scanner down there and then inform the CN (or whoever assigned this nurse to the help-all role) that she would be out of commission for awhile and wouldn't be able to do x, y, z next - - like performing a 100% non-emergent swallow eval on on ED patient. Well, what a ruckus all of that would've caused!

That's what I mean by swimming against the current 100% of the time.

But - - in sincere effort to not make excuses, I would ask people to forget all of that and instead look ahead. So the nurse is fired, V will make sure their little policy says that a patient receiving any kind of sedation must be monitored, and will for sure lock down the vecuronium so that it can't be accessed whether it is an emergency or not.

What are those things going to do about the next non-expert running here and there who is being timed and then ridiculed if s/he so chooses to act in a prudent manner when faced with a similar situation?

What if there was a way for someone who had not been adequately trained to insist on that training or refuse to go on the floor unsafe, without getting fired?

Versed is the brand name for midozalam. Vecuronium is the generic name for norcuron.

Is it possible the nurse thought vecuronium was the generic name for versed?

Is it common for an electronic medication system to use generic names sometimes and brand names other times? Could that be something to correct?