Published
issue 36 - april 3, 2006
tubing misconnections--a persistent and potentially deadly occurrence
tubing and catheter misconnection errors are an important and under-reported problem in health care organizations. in addition, these errors are often caught and corrected before any injury to the patient occurs. given the reality of and potential for life threatening consequences, increased awareness and analysis of these errors--including averted errors--can lead to dramatic improvement in patient safety.
to date, nine cases involving tubing misconnections have been reported to the joint commission's sentinel event database. these resulted in eight deaths and one instance of permanent loss of function, and affected seven adults and two infants. reports in the media and to organizations such as ecri, the food and drug administration (fda), the institute for safe medication practices (ismp), and united states pharmacopeia (usp) indicate that misconnection errors occur with significant frequency and, in a number of instances, lead to deadly consequences.
types of misconnections
the types of tubes and catheters involved in the cases reported to the joint commission included central intravenous catheters, peripheral intravenous catheters, nasogastric feeding tubes, percutaneous enteric feeding tubes, peritoneal dialysis catheters, tracheostomy cuff inflation tubes, and automatic blood pressure cuff insufflation tubes. the specific misconnections involved an enteric tube feeding into an intravenous catheter (4 cases); injection of barium sulfate (gi contrast medium) into a central venous catheter (1 case); an enteric tube feeding into a peritoneal dialysis catheter (1 case); a blood pressure insufflator tube connected to an intravenous catheter (2 cases); and injection of intravenous fluid into a tracheostomy cuff inflation tube (1 case).
a review by usp of more than 300 cases reported to its databases found misconnection errors involving the following:
many of the misconnection cases involved luer connectors--small devices used in the connection of many medical components and accessories. there are two types of luer connectors--slips and locks. a luer slip connector consist of a tapered "male" fitting that slips into a wider "female" fitting to create a secure connection. the luer lock connector has a threaded collar on the "male" fitting and a flange on the "female" fitting that screw together to create a more secure connection. examples of misconnections involving luer connectors include the following:
root causes identified
the basic lesson from these cases is that if it can happen, it will happen. luer connectors are implicated in or contribute to many of these errors because they enable functionally dissimilar tubes or catheters to be connected. other identified causes include the routine use of tubes or catheters for unintended purposes, such as using iv extension tubing for epidurals, irrigation, drains, and central lines, or to extend enteric feeding tubes; and the positioning of functionally dissimilar tubes used in patient care in close proximity to one another. in the cases reported to the sentinel event database, contributing factors included movement of the patient from one setting or service to another, and staff fatigue associated with working consecutive shifts.
risk reduction strategies
there are currently no published standards that specifically restrict the use of luer connectors to certain medical devices. consequently, a broad range of medical devices, which have different functions and access the body through different routes, are often outfitted with luer fittings that can be easily misconnected. organizations in europe and the u.s. are now developing standards to restrict the types of devices that use luer fittings in an attempt to mitigate misconnection hazards. according to jim keller, vice president, health technology evaluation and safety for ecri, and stephanie joseph, project engineer for ecri, the solution to reducing--even eliminating--misconnection errors lies in both engineering controls respecting how products and devices are designed ("incompatibility by design"), and in re-engineering work practices.
"a well-designed device should prevent misconnections and should prompt the user to take the correct action," explains joseph, author of a guidance article published in the march 2006 issue of ecri's health devices journal. as a first step in prevention, joseph urges hospitals to avoid buying non-intravenous equipment (such as nebulizers, nibp devices, and enteral feeding sets) that can mate with the luer connectors on patient iv lines. in addition, joseph emphasizes that the single most important work practice solution for clinicians is to trace all lines back to their origin before connecting or disconnecting any devices or infusions.
other solutions include specific education and training regarding this problem for all clinicians and having practitioners take simple precautions such as turning on the light in a darkened room before connecting or reconnecting tubes or devices. the risk of waking a sleeping patient is minimal by comparison. errors have also occurred when patients or family members attempt to disconnect and reconnect equipment themselves. staff should emphasize to all patients the importance of contacting a clinical staff member for assistance when there is an identified need to disconnect or reconnect devices.
other approaches to reducing the risk of misconnections that have been identified also have significant potential for unintended consequences. these include:
joint commission recommendations
the joint commission offers the following recommendations and strategies to health care organizations to reduce tubing misconnection errors:
in addition, the joint commission urges product manufacturers to implement "designed incompatibility," as appropriate, to prevent dangerous misconnections of tubes and catheters.
resources
ismp medication safety alert, june 17, 2004, www.ismp.org/msaarticles/tubingprint.htm
nursing 2005, 35 (9), september 2005, pg. 73, by melissa eakle, r.n., mba, msn; beverly albrecht gallauresi, r.n., b.s., mph; and audrey morrison, r.n.
fda patient safety news, show #31, september 2004; show #20, october 2003; show #46, december 2005
"fatal air embolism caused by the misconnection of a medical device hoses to needleless luer ports on iv administration sets" [hazard report], ecri, health devices, june 2004; 33(6):223-5
"misconnected flowmeter leads to two deaths" [special report], ecri, health devices alerts, january 25, 2003
"preventing misconnections of lines and cables," ecri, health devices, march 2006; 35(3):81-95
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other jcaho alerts located:sentinel event alert
Obviously many issues at play here. Fatigue, understaffing, high patient acuity, etc.
Regarding the tube feeding into the IV line... our GI docs started using a new PEG tube that had a luer lock and needed a feeding line that looked very much like an IV line. Scared the crap out of me, as I envisioned just this scenario. I labeled the hell out of it. People laughed and thought I was being paranoid, but in 23 years I've seen some stupid things.
Concerning the misconnections. Questions, arise on the nature of the unit in which this happened. Understaffing and overworked, Rn's are tired and stressed. The shame is that all this happened in the first place. I am not convinced that it happened under properly skilled alert RNs. The hospital, unit manager or staffing coordinator, I think may bear some responsibility.
As a RN ONLY YOU are responsible for your practise. You have people's lives in your hands. By god if you are too tired, overworked, intoxicated on drugs or alcohol, or are in too much of a hurry then you better not be giving medications especially through central lines. The hospital, manager, etc... are not responsible for that life, you are. That is why we are taught the 5 rights and that is why we MUST practise it.
10/07 more news:
I would have been the first to agree that it's stupidity/impairment UNTIL it nearly happened to me. In our NICU it's not uncommon for someone to use 60" microbore luer-lock med tubing instead of an enteral feed extension set because the former is usually easier to find. A 6Fr NGT is just the right size for that microbore tubing. So yeah, I once ALMOST hooked up a breast milk feed to an IV while on orientation. I caught it, but I almost didn't. And I was neither stupid nor high. Never change a feed syringe and a med syringe at the same time, kiddies.
Now I'm the tubing Nazi. I go a little crazy looking for those *&&^((* enteral extension sets that actually don't fit as well and have to be taped on to go with our PEG fittings. Oh, and even those have luer-locks at the syringe end. We don't even stock non-luer syringes on my floor. Oh, and JCAHO is coming next week. This should be fun...
[...] I'd hate to have been the nurse who said, ok while I'm at it let's give him some MOM and then boom. Dead patient, bybye license. It would have been well worth it to take some extra time to squirt the MoM into a paper cup.
~~~~~~~~~
Wow. I had never stopped to think about it. We give our Histussin in syringes and usually my people either like to squirt it into their mouths themselves or have me do it if they are elderly and feeble. However, I think from now on I am going to squirt it into a cup. Thanks for the tip.
:doh: OMG, I can't believe that, this is good information, and will sure to label lines more carefully. As someone posted earlier, MOM is white, and why wouldn't you stop to think before giving that, but Propofol is an IV med that is also white. However, if you have both MOM and propofol in syringes, for some reason. CLEARLY label those meds. Some of those things are scary, and I hope nothing like that happens to me. I am not perfect by any stretch of the imagination, but I always follow tubing that I'm changing or connecting into, from point of orgin back (or vise versa), to BE SURE, that I am connecting or changing the right line.
~~~~~~~~~Wow. I had never stopped to think about it. We give our Histussin in syringes and usually my people either like to squirt it into their mouths themselves or have me do it if they are elderly and feeble. However, I think from now on I am going to squirt it into a cup. Thanks for the tip.
what is MOM?
pawashrn
183 Posts
Concerning the misconnections. Questions, arise on the nature of the unit in which this happened. Understaffing and overworked, Rn's are tired and stressed. The shame is that all this happened in the first place. I am not convinced that it happened under properly skilled alert RNs. The hospital, unit manager or staffing coordinator, I think may bear some responsibility.