Swine Flu Updates and Issues

Nurses COVID

Published

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/16/AR2009051601850.html?hpid=moreheadlines

The swine-origin influenza A (H1N1) virus that burst into public consciousness a month ago is starting to behave like a mixture of its infamous, pandemic-causing predecessors.

It seems to have a predilection for young adults, as did its notorious ancestor, the 1918 Spanish influenza. Many of the young victims who have become deathly ill turned out to have other medical problems -- a phenomenon first clearly seen with the 1957 Asian flu.

Pandemic flu strains -- and this new H1N1 strain is all but certain to cause the 21st century's first pandemic -- are unpredictable. Any contagious disease that most of the world's 6.8 billion people can catch is inherently dangerous.

"Our message to everybody is, of course, do not over-worry about these things, [but] it is important to know it is serious," the WHO's Keiji Fukuda said last week.

Perhaps the most worrisome features so far are the number and severity of cases in teenagers and young adults. This was noticed early, and the pattern has not changed much now that there are 5,000 laboratory-confirmed infections and probably more than 100,000 overall. The average age of the confirmed and probable cases is 15 years. Two-thirds are younger than 18.

Compared with seasonal outbreaks, all flu pandemics cause a higher percentage of severe cases and deaths in younger groups. Although the overall mortality rate from the current swine flu is low, this trend is already apparent.

Last Thursday, when Fukuda announced that the global death total was 65, he noted that "half of them are healthy people who have no predisposing conditions. This is a pattern different from what we see with normal influenza."

There have been too few deaths in the United States to draw any conclusions. But of the 173 people who have been sick enough to be hospitalized, more than half are in the 5-to-24 age group.

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http://afludiary.blogspot.com/2009/05/japan-rapid-influenza-test-sensitivity.html

The Japanese, who generally regard influenza far more seriously than a lot of other societies, have taken the extra step of PCR testing a number of H1N1 patients who initially tested negative for Influenza A using the rapid influenza tests routinely found in doctors offices.

About 30% (range 12%-47%) of people they double-checked actually had the H1N1 virus.

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http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/25/nyregion/25swine.html?_r=1

A second New York City resident, a woman from Queens in her 50s, has died from swine flu, the city's health department said on Sunday.

The woman had an underlying health condition that made her more at risk from the disease, said Jessica Scaperotti, a health department spokeswoman.

The number of people hospitalized with swine flu since the beginning of the outbreak in New York City at the end of April had risen to 94 on Sunday from 68 Saturday and 57 on Friday, health department officials said, suggesting that the rate of infection and hospitalization might be increasing.

Ms. Scaperotti could not say how many of those patients were now hospitalized or how many were in critical condition. On Friday, St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital Center said it had a patient in critical condition with swine flu at its location in Morningside Heights. Doctors there were optimistic that the patient's condition was improving.

"As we see more cases in the community we are going to see more severe illness and possibly death," Ms. Scaperotti said. "If you're sick right now with flu, you probably have H1N1."

Seventeen public schools and programs will still be closed, although they are all slated to reopen by Thursday.

In addition, at least four yeshivas in the greater Flatbush area of Brooklyn have voluntarily closed due to swine flu, according to Assemblyman Dov Hikind, who represents the district.

Each school had an unusually high absentee rate, and upon investigation this weekend, school officials discovered probable or confirmed swine flu cases.

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H1N1 Morbidity And Previously Existing Conditions

http://afludiary.blogspot.com/2009/05/h1n1-morbidity-and-previously-existing.html

Groups at Higher Risk for Severe Illness from Novel Influenza A (H1N1) Infection

Groups of people at higher risk for severe illness from novel influenza A (H1N1) infection are thought to be the same as those people at higher risk for severe illness from seasonal influenza. These groups include:

Children younger than 5 years old

Persons aged 65 years or older

Children and adolescents (younger than 18 years) who are receiving long-term aspirin therapy and who might be at risk for experiencing Reye syndrome after influenza virus infection

Pregnant women

Adults and children who have pulmonary, including asthma, cardiovascular, hepatic, hematological, neurologic, neuromuscular, or metabolic disorders such as diabetes

Adults and children who have immunosuppression (including immunosuppression caused by medications or by HIV)

Residents of nursing homes and other chronic-care facilities.

Essentially the same risk groups that are more vulnerable to seasonal flu.

Media reports have also connected obesity and smoking to some of the hospitalizations, both here in the United States and in Mexico, but these have not (yet) made the list.

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Two More Deaths in NYC

http://www.nydailynews.com/ny_local/2009/05/26/2009-05-26_two_more_new_yorkers_.html

More cases in one place will most likely result in more flu deaths. Of course, they are said to have prior existing conditions. Hopefully, those conditions will be revealed so that we can agree or disagree that those conditions could have contributed to their deaths.

Two more New Yorkers infected with swine flu have died, but both had other health problems and it's not clear if the virus killed them, officials said Tuesday.

The announcement, which came as students returned to two dozen public and private schools and five more closed over flu fears, brings the potential death toll in the city to four.

Both victims - a 42-year-old woman from Queens and a 34-year-old man from Brooklyn - died May 22. Autopsies will determine whether the H1N1 virus was the cause, Health Commissioner Thomas Frieden said.

"Until the medical examiner's report comes out, we won't know what else was going on," Frieden said. "It is possible or likely that it [H1N1] may have contributed."

The latest two victims, whose names were not released, also had health problems that made them more vulnerable, Frieden said.

The commissioner said neither victim worked in the school system, as far as he knew. He said neither was "medically attended" before death, meaning they either died at home or couldn't be resuscitated when help arrived.

Preliminary school attendance records showed that 83.26% of the school's 1,550 students showed up at IS 238 Tuesday, compared with about 92% typically.

Nine more city schools will reopen today, and nine others will remain closed, including the newly shuttered Public School 811 in Queens, a school for disabled children.

City Councilman Tony Avella (D-Queens) and parents at PS 31 in Bayside called for their school to be closed for cleaning, citing a high absentee rate. But it wasn't one of the five schools - one in Queens, one in Manhattan, two in Brooklyn and one in the Bronx - that will be closed today...

The Department of Education is seeking a waiver from the state so the school year doesn't have to be extended past June 26 for closed schools. The city could lose some funding if schools don't hold classes for 180 days.

The city has confirmed 330 cases of H1N1, with 131 requiring hospitalization. Frieden pointed out that the city typically has about 1,000 deaths from flu a year, but added that H1N1 appears to be more contagious.

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This was copied from Newsweek's article about swine flu, last week:

"The jackpot events in influenza evolution occur when two different types of flu viruses happen to get into an animal cell at the same time, swapping entire chromosomes to create "reassorted" viruses."

That describes mutations of different species, into combinations of "reassorted viruses' that are more dangerous than the original ones....

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The Swine Flu Crisis:

The Government Is Preparing for the Worst While Hoping for the Best - It Needs to Tell the Public to Do the Same Thing!

http://psandman.com/col/swineflu1.htm

I stongly suggest that you think about this bit of advice from a famous risk communicator, who is very familar with pandemic preparations.

...whatever the situation is like by the time you read this, that won't be the end of the story either. A mutated virus (more virulent or more transmissible or resistant to antivirals) could come roaring back a few months later.

The CDC's biggest failure: not doing nearly enough to help people visualize what a really bad pandemic might be like - while helping them also to hold in mind that it's only one of many possibilities - so they can feel the knot in their stomachs that everyone on the inside is feeling, get past this adjustment reaction, gird up their loins, and start preparing.

It is especially important to get this message to business and community leaders, who have prep work to do ASAP in case things get worse.

But individuals also have prep work to do - logistical as well as emotional prep work. All that preparing will stand us in good stead even if The Big One isn't right around the corner yet ... and it'll be essential if it is!

For the ordinary citizen, the U.S. government has so far recommended only hygiene, not preparedness. It has told people to stay home if they're sick, cover their coughs, and wash their hands a lot. It hasn't told people to stock up on food, water, prescription medicines, and other key supplies. Two years ago HHS Secretary Mike Leavitt was crisscrossing the country with that advice. These past few days Acting CDC Director Richard Besser kept evading questions from journalists about whether it's still good advice.

I don't fault Dr. Besser for looking and sounding reassuring. The gold standard in crisis communication is to say alarming things in a calm tone, and he is doing exactly that.

The problem is that he isn't giving us anything to do except practice good hygiene.

From the start of the swine flu crisis, I believe, there was a decision - probably a very high-level decision - to take the situation extremely seriously but to hold off on asking the public to do the same. The result is almost surreal. The federal government has already released one-quarter of the Strategic National Stockpile of antiviral drugs to the states, so there will be millions of courses of Tamiflu ready to deploy if there are millions of sick Americans requiring medication. But it hasn't yet asked those millions of Americans to stock up on tuna fish and peanut butter.

I have been here before. In 2005, the pandemic influenza threat came from an avian H5N1, instead of the current swine-avian-human hybrid H1N1. (Lest anyone forget, H5N1 is still around too.) The CDC and HHS were similarly convinced then that the risk was serious, similarly committed to aggressive preparatory action - that's why we have that Strategic National Stockpile of antivirals - and similarly disinclined to alarm the American people. The feeling was that people had been alarmed enough by 9/11 and the ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and that the government had pretty much exhausted its quota of scary utterances. There is much the same feeling today about the economic meltdown.

I was in the minority then, as I am now, urging officials to involve the public in its pandemic preparedness efforts. In February 2005, I was invited to give a day-long seminar on my recommendations to a high-level conclave of CDC and HHS infectious disease experts and officials. They heard me out, sent me home, and reaffirmed their policy of quiet preparedness.

In order to avoid frightening the public, this past week, the U.S. government has avoided clueing in the public that we should all be preparing for a possible pandemic - not just the feds.

Why are officials so leery of describing the worst case vividly and urging people to prepare for that possibility? Here's why:

There is a virtual terror of frightening people excessively (as if that were easy). Although crisis management experts have known for decades that panic is rare, officials routinely go into "panic panic" - either predicting that the public will panic if told alarming things or misdiagnosing orderly efforts to prepare as panic. A Google News search this morning for "swine flu panic" netted over 8,000 hits. Some of them were urging people not to panic (unnecessary and condescending advice); a few were pointing out that people weren't in fact panicking, not even in Mexico City.

Officials who imagine that the public is panicking or may soon panic often feel impelled to make over-reassuring statements, to suppress alarming information, and to belittle those who are frightened as "irrational" or "hysterical" (or "panicky"). These official preemptive strikes leave frightened people alone with their fears, and persuade them that their government has betrayed them and cannot be trusted. The result is an increase in public anxiety, which officials cannot properly channel into effective action because they have already delegitimized the fear and because they are unwilling to involve the public. During the 2003 SARS outbreaks, for example, the Chinese government denied that Beijing was seeing SARS cases and SARS deaths. These false denials led to actual panic in Beijing. Why did the Chinese government hide the truth? To allay panic.

To its credit, the CDC has not made over-reassuring statements, suppressed alarming information, or belittled people's fears. For several days before the first U.S. swine flu death this morning, Dr. Besser continually predicted that there would soon be U.S. deaths. That's excellent risk communication. He's not understating how bad things are or how bad things could get. His failure (of skill? of nerve? of policy?) is subtler than that: He is creating the sense that the CDC will do whatever needs doing to protect us, and that we need do little or nothing to protect ourselves. I think this is intentional, aimed at avoiding what he or his superiors consider excessive public alarm.

Already the same officials that I am criticizing for under-warning the public are being accused by others of over-warning the public. And of course if the virus recedes and this pandemic never materializes, these critics will consider themselves vindicated ... as if the fact that your house didn't burn down this year proved the foolishness of last year's decision to buy fire insurance. It is dangerous nonsense to imagine that warnings are justified only if they are followed quickly enough by disasters. People who don't take precautions often escape injury. That makes them lucky, not wise.

The risk communication solution to this quandary is to issue warnings that are simultaneously scary and tentative. Public health officials need to learn how to say "This could get very bad, and it's time to prepare in case it does" and "This could fizzle out, and we'll probably feel a bit foolish if it does" - to say them both at the same time, in the same sound bite.

Of course we don't know anything yet about the relative probabilities of different swine flu outcomes. Flu experts say the way things look right now is the way a disastrous pandemic could look at this early stage - and it's also the way a false alarm could look at this early stage.

Warnings about swine flu are particularly difficult in another way as well: bad precedent. The problem is partly grounded in the 1976 swine flu fiasco, when the U.S. prematurely launched a vaccination program that caused more illness than that no-show pandemic did. But the bigger source of official hesitation, I suspect, is the 2005-2006 bird flu scare. Public health authorities then seemed to be implying that the bird flu virus was expected to mutate and launch a human pandemic by next Tuesday. But the virus remained (and so far remains) confined to countless millions of birds and a few hundred profoundly unlucky people.

(There are some key differences between the two pandemic threats, other than the fact that one is still theoretical and the other looks imminent. The H5N1 bird flu still hasn't learned how to spread easily from person to person, a skill the H1N1 swine flu has amply demonstrated already. On the other hand, H5N1 has killed over half the people it has infected, whereas the new H1N1 looks comparatively mild so far ... though not as mild as early U.S. reports implied. Another difference: In the U.S. and most of the developed world, we now have a sizable supply of antivirals that are known to work - so far - against the swine flu virus we're facing.)

It's a calming experience to prepare. As psychiatrists sometimes put it, "action binds anxiety." Having things you can do that seem likely to improve your situation gives people a sense of control; it builds self-efficacy, which leads to determination, calm, and even confidence. It's not that taking action makes people less fearful; rather, it makes people more able to bear their fear.

Those who have been working hard not to worry about the pandemic that might be looming will feel more in control after they have taken some concrete steps to get themselves and their family ready.

The other psychological effect of precaution-taking may matter less to the CDC right now, but it matters just as much to the country's prognosis if a pandemic happens. Some people - a lot of people, in fact - are not yet very worried about a possible swine flu pandemic....

When officials urge people to take precautions, that doesn't necessarily pierce the apathy - but it helps. Each time officials repeat the advice, more people take it. Some of them take it skeptically, but take it nonetheless.

As social psychologists know well, attitudes follow behavior far more reliably than they determine behavior.

In other words, we learn from what we do. If the CDC can get insufficiently concerned people to stockpile supplies against a possible pandemic, the mere act of doing so will make them more attentive to swine flu news and more concerned about pandemic preparedness.

So urging people to prepare is a twofer: it calms those whose concern is excessive and arouses those whose concern is insufficient. Not to mention the benefits of having the right stuff on hand if it becomes dangerous to go out in public, or if supply lines are disrupted and the stuff isn't available anymore.

Our thinking about pandemics has been conditioned by H5N1, the bird flu virus that has killed more than half the people it infected. We have become accustomed to assuming that any pandemic would be a catastrophic pandemic. 1918 genuinely was catastrophic, even though its case fatality rate was only 2-3 percent - lower than the apparent rate for H1N1 in Mexico so far (not to mention the appalling rate for H5N1). The other two twentieth century pandemics, 1957 and 1968, were mild, not catastrophic; for most non-professionals they were non-events. The Pandemic of 2009 could be just as mild.

Or it could be catastrophic. Or somewhere in the middle.

So the key question is what to say to the public when a pandemic may well be imminent, but may still fizzle or stay poised at the brink or turn out anticlimactically mild.

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Stockpiling Food for Small Spaces and Small Budgets

http://www.latah.id.us/disasterservices/Disaster_Pandemic_StockpilingFood.pdf

For next fall/winter, just in case. I will repeat this practical advice periodically because you never know. Stuff happens and not just pandemics...

This sample plan is designed to give a family of four (2 adults and 2 children under 7) a cheap, compact

way to store a 2-week supply of food to meet their basic nutritional needs. This plan is designed for my

family, taking into consideration our weight, ages, and food preferences (no artificial ingredients) - but it

can easily be adapted for families of different numbers, sizes and ages.

This plan is:

* Compact: A 2-week supply fits into a 66 gallon clear storage box.

* Expandable: add as many 2-week boxes as you wish to get food for your desired timeframe

* Cheap: a 2-week supply of "bare bones basics" costs about $100 (cheaper if on sale)

* Nutritious: It meets our family's basic survival nutritional needs (calories, protein, fiber) and

gives options for meeting vitamin and mineral needs.

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Swine flu: "mild strain" kills two more New Yorkers

http://scienceblogs.com/effectmeasure/2009/05/swine_flu_mild_strain_kills_tw.php

...As long as it is described in terms of familiar seasonal influenza the public is all right with it -- until they get a good dose of this really miserable illness. Meanwhile New York City's Mayor Bloomberg is getting a taste of what can happen when you minimize the seriousness of a disease that always deserves great respect:

A day after Mayor Bloomberg told reporters that those with swine flu are "lucky" because it's a mild strain, he struck a more sympathetic tone, urging anyone with medical problems to seek help if they feel ill.

"As the virus spreads through the city and through this country and around the world, these deaths sadden us, but I don't think they take us by surprise," he said. 'That doesn't, however, lessen the loss of loved ones." (Carrie Melago, New York Daily News)

This "mild strain" has now killed four New Yorkers in less than a month and put 131 of the 330 confirmed cases in the hospital -- and those numbers are undoubtedly the tip of the iceberg. If this were a food poisoning or an industrial accident it would make headlines in every newspaper in the country.

I have some minor complaints about CDC's messaging (it is false that 36,000 people die of flu every year; no one is served by repeating a falsehood), but I think for the most part they have done it right. Be straightforward about what plausibly might happen and what we do and don't know. The differences between New York's messaging and CDC's have been relatively small but important. They involve tone and the seriousness with which they take the situation. I want to think that this is mainly Bloomberg and not his health commissioner, Thomas Frieden (who will take over as the next CDC Director in June).

I guess we'll see pretty soon. Fingers crossed.

The Editors of Effect Measure are senior public health scientists and practitioners. Paul Revere was a member of the first local Board of Health in the United States (Boston, 1799). The Editors sign their posts "Revere" to recognize the public service of a professional forerunner better known for other things.

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Managing and Reducing Uncertainty in an Emerging Influenza Pandemic

http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/full/NEJMp0904380

The early phases of an epidemic present decision makers with predictable challenges1 that have been evident as the current novel influenza A (H1N1) virus has spread. The scale of the problem is uncertain when a disease first appears but may increase rapidly. Early action is required, but decisions about action must be made when the threat is only modest-and consequently, they involve a trade-off between the comparatively small, but nearly certain, harm that an intervention may cause (such as rare adverse events from large-scale vaccination or economic and social costs from school dismissals) and the uncertain probability of much greater harm from a widespread outbreak. This combination of urgency, uncertainty, and the costs of interventions makes the effort to control infectious diseases especially difficult.

The proportion of severe cases is overestimated in settings where many mild cases are not reported or tested, a situation that is becoming more common as public health officials become unable to test a large fraction of suspected cases. In contrast, severity estimates are biased downward when they are calculated as simple ratios of numbers of deaths to numbers of cases, because there is a delay between the onset of illness and death. During the 1918 influenza pandemic, the mean time from symptom onset to death was 8 to 9 days,2 whereas the number of cases was doubling about every 3 days. With a similar delay, today's deaths would reflect the state of the epidemic three doublings ago, when there were about one eighth the number of cases there are now. If modern therapies have extended the time between onset and death, the censoring bias will be even more pronounced. Such uncertainty has made it impossible to assess severity confidently.

Moreover, several other factors suggest that it is premature to dismiss concerns about severity. First, this virus tends to infect relatively young, healthy people, and it caused a high hospitalization rate of 2% in the United States even before testing shifted to emphasize severe cases.3 Second, the much higher proportion of people likely to be infected in a pandemic (because of limited immunity to the new strain) will mean substantially higher levels of severe outcomes than usual. A virus that is fatal in "only" 0.15% of cases but infects twice the typical number of people would cause about three times as many deaths as typical influenza, or more than 100,000 deaths in the United States. Moreover, this "mild" illness will almost certainly take a more severe toll in less wealthy countries, as infectious diseases routinely do. The Northern Hemisphere may see a decline in transmission over the summer, but the 1918 pandemic demonstrated that sustained spring and summer transmission is possible for a novel influenza strain, and the Southern Hemisphere is entering its influenza season now. The Southern Hemisphere, at least, and possibly the entire world, is likely to see a substantial epidemic of this virus in the next few months, with attack rates exceeding those in a typical influenza season, before significant quantities of vaccine become available.

(hat tip crofsblog)

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http://www.recombinomics.com/News/05260901/WHO_Phase_Daze.html

Dr. Niman calls it like he sees it, and he is more often right than wrong. He does have a point about vaccines. Remember that a vaccine is always chasing a moving target, and the swine virus is a fast moving one as well.

But even as the virus infected people in Britain, Spain and Japan, the agency did not go to Level 6, which signifies spread to a new continent. Dr. Fukuda argued that there was still no proof of "community spread," meaning beyond travelers, schools and contacts.

The above comment, as well as similar remarks by WHO officials and other government agencies, range from delusional to deliberate distortions with regard to the current phase 6 pandemic. The constant rewriting of the phase system to avoid calling a phase 6 pandemic a phase 6 pandemic does significant harm in the monitoring of the pandemic, as well as raising public awareness of the seriousness of the evolution and spread of swine H1N1.

The WHO position and phase 5 designation continues to focus efforts away from the real problem of community spread, and hopeless programs focused on international travelers.

Since the swine virus is now efficiently transmitted in a human host, it will continue to adapt and will likely cause significantly more fatal cases, as was seen in 1918...the community spread will lead to the emergence of new variants, which will be largely missed because of the misplaced emphasis.

When the new variants are identified, they will have established a strong foothold and will spread rapidly, once again avoiding belated containment efforts. The establishment will speed the spread, which will also impact vaccine efforts, because the identification of the emergent strain will happen well after the spread has accelerated.

Thus, the efforts of WHO to deny phase 6, and misplaced surveillance efforts which target international travel, will accelerate the emergence of variants, which will increase the likelihood that containment and vaccine efforts will fail.

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CDC Too Optimistic About Flu Peak?

http://blogs.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2009/05/cdc-too-optimis.html

ILI stands for influenza like illness.

On 26 May, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention suggested that the swine flu outbreak in the country might have crested. But Donald Olson, a New York City-based epidemiologist who runs the influenza monitoring project at the International Society for Disease Surveillance (ISDS), disagrees. "If New York City, Boston, and Seattle are indicators of what's to come for the rest of the country, then we ain't seen nothing yet," says Olson.

Although CDC had also noted increases in Boston and New York City, Olson says his more carefully porificed data show "massive increases" that look "mild" in the CDC regional data. CDC also shows ILI in Seattle dropping down at week 20, which is the opposite of what ISDS finds. Unfortunately, says Olson, no one has systematically collected data about the actual presence of the new H1N1 virus, as it would overtax testing labs. "We're dealing with so much uncertainty, and we have imperfect measures," says Olson. "But we need to know what they're weaknesses are."

Olson says it's possible that the epidemic exploded, quickly infected the susceptible population, and will now fade out, but he doubts that, given that New York City has seen the disease peak, drop, and then peak again. "If what New York City has seen in last 10 days is any indication, we're going to be seeing that everywhere else," says Olson.

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