Published
From: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
Shaping systems for better behavioral choices: lessons learned from a fatal medication error. Smetzer J, Baker C, Byrne FD, Cohen MR. Jt Comm J Qual Patient Saf. 2010;36:152-163, 1AP-2AP.
Full text: http://psnet.ahrq.gov/public/Smetzer-JCJQPS-2010-s4.pdfThis article discusses how a hospital responded to a fatal medication error that occurred when a nurse mistakenly administered epidural pain medication intravenously to a pregnant teenager. Findings from the root cause analysis of the error revealed underlying factors including fatigue (the nurse had worked a double shift the day before), failed safety systems (the hospital had recently implemented a bar coding system, but not all nurses were trained and workarounds were routine), and human factors engineering (bags containing antibiotics and pain medications were similar in appearance and could be accessed with the same type of catheter). A range of safety interventions were implemented as a result. However, the related editorials by leaders in the safety field (Drs. Sidney Dekker, Charles Denham, and Lucian Leape) take the hospital to task for focusing on narrow improvements rather than using complexity theory to solve underlying problems, and for creating a "second victim" by disciplining the nurse (who was fired and ultimately criminally prosecuted) rather than acknowledging the institution's responsibility and the caregiver's emotional distress.The article and commentaries provide a fascinating, in-depth look at the true impact of a never event.
There is a second tragedy at St. Mary’s Hospital that isscarcely hinted at in the otherwise excellent report by
Smetzer et al. of the investigation and response to a terrible fatal
medication error.1 That tragedy is what happened to the nurse
who made the error, Julie Thao, whom the hospital blamed for
the mishap and fired. Not only was this action calamitous for
Julie, but if the hospital had taken institutional responsibility at
the outset, the criminal indictment and loss of licensure might
not have occurred. Julie was truly a second victim in more ways
than one....
,,Because, as the mantra since the Institute of Medicine
report To Err Is Human 2 insistently reminds us: Errors and
mishaps are caused by bad systems, not by bad people. Who is
responsible for the systems? The hospital. Individual frontline
caregivers—doctors and nurses—do not create or change systems,
the organization does.
I didn't see in the article, but I wonder if they tried intralipids to treat the patient. Intralipids are about the only thing that has been proven to help with local anesthetic toxicity. Wolters Kluwer Health
I know this comment is really late, but from what I understand, they weren't aware of the med error when they were trying to resuscitate her. It wasn't until afterwards that they realized what had happened. They thought she was having an anaphylactic reaction to the penicillin and treated for that.
XingtheBBB, BSN, RN
198 Posts
I'm seeing what I've said so many times. We have to spend so much time creating a pretty Joint Commission approved chart with teaching plans, i's dotted and t's crossed on the admission database (wonder how many pages it was?) and care plans that show we care about psychosocial coping have to be filled out. Forbid that our managers do a chart audit and find a deficiency!
Surely during all that, the family made numerous requests for more ice water, cookies, warmer blankets, and interrupted with cell phone calls. Forbid that our mangers do administrative (kiss-butt) rounds and find we haven't catered to our patients' comfort. So what gets looked over? The most "routine" tasks. We have no time left for safe patient care.