Will you work during a Pandemic? - page 42

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  1. by   marslarks
    wiht or without pay..im willing to work during pandemic..it doesnt matter what happens to me, what matters is you have help and save thousands..anyways hiding yourself from all the diseases doenst guarantee you wont have one..we are nurses..we have work during disasters annd holidays..if you cant take this kind of life, then probably nursing is not for you..
  2. by   achot chavi
    Quote from lamazeteacher
    While nurses certainly aren't in the same income bracket as doctors, attitudes such as the above one, indicate the opportunistic tendency among health professionals, that taints our credibility.

    Like opportunistic infections, this tendency thrives in financially weakened areas, causing greater deficits.
    [FONT="Comic Sans MS"]I disagree, we should do our jobs with integrity and professionalism etc., but we shouldn't sell ourselves short,
    we aren't asking for MORE than we deserve by asking for proper financial compensation for our work, as we could be using that time for other more lucrative positions or be home with all that entails. We deserve our salaries and they are typically - less than we should be earning. If asked to work as a traveling nurse, we should be compensated as such.
    I think it is a far jump to accuse us of being opportunistic, and asking for proper compensation does not taint our credibility!!!
  3. by   achot chavi
    Quote from marslarks
    wiht or without pay..im willing to work during pandemic..it doesnt matter what happens to me, what matters is you have help and save thousands..anyways hiding yourself from all the diseases doenst guarantee you wont have one..we are nurses..we have work during disasters annd holidays..if you cant take this kind of life, then probably nursing is not for you..

    I agree with all the rest but NOT with the first 4 words
    Why should we provide a valuable service and not be compensated...lets not get over dramatic about things, the world is not ending...even with this pandemic.

    Regarding not caring about what happens to you....How can you say that, of course you care about yourself or you couldn't care about others...Helping others is important but you must also take care of yourself as well-
  4. by   Girl Scout
    Btw... the scenario in the OP is a really grave, end-of-rope scenario. The poll is not about the 2009 pandemic as it stands right at this moment.

    First... if I don't care about myself, how in the world would I be able to care about someone else? That just doesn't make sense. It matters very much to me and my family what happens to me, and I bet it matters to my residents and pts if I'm not there any more because I got sick and died (per the OP) because I didn't care about what happened to me.

    Second, I am never going to work without pay unless I am voluntarily providing my services. Note the "voluntary" part - volunteerism. I do volunteer work now, I like to do volunteer work during disasters also (Red Cross disaster response team member here). But I'm not going to be forced to work without pay. I'm sure saying "with or without pay" could mean volunteerism, but I also can't imagine a scenario where a facility I'm working at and is paying me, suddenly changes me to a volunteer in the midst of a disaster so that I have to work for no pay. I still need to buy food and medicine and insurance to keep myself healthy so that I can work, so I need a paycheck.

    Third, I may be just a nursing assistant, but I don't think it's fair to anyone to basically say "you are unworthy of the title of Nurse, if you are unwilling to go to the lengths that I think you should go to."
  5. by   GooeyRN
    With or without pay??? How will you feed yourself/your family and pay your bills?
  6. by   mello1177
    can't figure out why someone would become a nurse if they would not
  7. by   marslarks
    im not being overly dramatic about things..it depends on one's opinion of things..i respect of that of yours..what i meant was on volunteering so im willing to volunteer without pay..and with regards to payment ive been working over a year now in a hospital were i work too much and they pay little..so there is no actually difference if thre is payment or not..second of all even if i get paid its not enough to compensate me for my daily expenses so my parents still actually gives me allowance since they know that here in our country nurses are underpaid..thats why im willing to work during pandemic..3rd of all maybe im thinking this way because im single and i know that my family can provide themselves with everything so im wiling to go to the extremes..and 4th with proper precautionary measures and im sure vaccines, mask etc are given before you work or volunteer so i dont think we will easily get sick so that means i still be able to take care of others..answer me this..what if there is an outbreak of something and no one to pay you, would you help knowing you know about health???
  8. by   GooeyRN
    The original scenerio was working WITHOUT gloves, masks, gowns, etc. Basically, an automatic death sentence.
  9. by   ssing45
    Quote from marslarks
    wiht or without pay..im willing to work during pandemic..it doesnt matter what happens to me, what matters is you have help and save thousands..anyways hiding yourself from all the diseases doenst guarantee you wont have one..we are nurses..we have work during disasters annd holidays..if you cant take this kind of life, then probably nursing is not for you..
    How very noble of you but...

    1. Nurses are taught not to judge anyone else's circumstance, have you forgotten?

    2. If you get sick and die how can you help thousands? You'll be dead.
  10. by   Laidback Al
    Quote from marslarks
    ...and 4th with proper precautionary measures and im sure vaccines, mask etc are given before you work or volunteer so i dont think we will easily get sick so that means i still be able to take care of others..answer me this..what if there is an outbreak of something and no one to pay you, would you help knowing you know about health???
    Having carefully followed the JIT (Just In Time) world wide economic distribution system, I think it is highly unlikely that there will be enough PPE for all HCWs once hospitals and medical facilities are overwhelmed. Similarly, I doubt there will be enough vaccine available, even for all the HCWs that are willing to be vaccinated.

    The news report are unclear, but it seems to me that there are hospitals and medical facilities that are already being overrun by the "worried well" as well as real H1N1 cases. The only thing that has allowed the pandemic to progress this far without much panic is the low reported death rates. But the analysis at FluTrackers suggests H1N1 associated deaths are being under reported in the USA and possibly around the world.

    I appreciate you noble intentions, marslarks. But if you can't protect yourself from becoming infected, how will you be able to help those who are.
  11. by   lamazeteacher
    Quote from GooeyRN
    The original scenerio was working WITHOUT gloves, masks, gowns, etc. Basically, an automatic death sentence.
    Please don't make erroneous statements like that last one! Too many health horror movies on the market, I think.........

    That scenario has been miscommunicated. Go to the OP, CDC's updates showing the low incidence of reported H1N1 and the relatively few deaths resulting from it. As some one pointed out in some post on this thread, gloves, goggles, and gowns are only used if a splash of blood/body fluids is anticipated, in the instance of deep open wound dressing changes; and if dressing supplies run out, it will be long before newly mass ordered PPEs do.

    What is more likely, is that frightened, undereducated health care employees may, in their frustration, stockpile PPE in their cars, where it could get dirty, and then the amount of supplies ordered in large quantities in anticipation of another possibly more lethal wave of H1N1, the shelves holding such equipment would empty much sooner. We all know that petty theft of hospital supplies is a growing problem. If you see any of that going on, you need to report it. Theft is theft - no excuse for it!
    Last edit by lamazeteacher on Jun 19, '09 : Reason: added emphasis
  12. by   Girl Scout
    Quote from lamazeteacher
    Please don't make erroneous statements like that last one! Too many health horror movies on the market, I think.........
    With how the OP phrased it, the situation was very bleak. The OP isn't about H1N1, it's about H5N1, which has a very high fatality rate, still.
  13. by   lamazeteacher
    well, here are the latest cdc stats:

    synopsis:

    during week 23 (june 7-13, 2009), influenza activity decreased in the united states, however, there were still higher levels of influenza-like illness than is normal for this time of year.
    • two thousand seven hundred sixty-five (38.7%) specimens tested by u.s. world health organization (who) and national respiratory and enteric virus surveillance system (nrevss) collaborating laboratories and reported to cdc/influenza division were positive for influenza.
    • over 98% of all subtyped influenza a viruses being reported to cdc were pandemic influenza a (h1n1) viruses.
    • the proportion of deaths attributed to pneumonia and influenza (p&i) was slightly above the epidemic threshold.
    • one influenza-associated pediatric death was reported and was associated with pandemic influenza a (h1n1) virus infection.
    • the proportion of outpatient visits for influenza-like illness (ili) was below the national baseline. one of the 10 surveillance regions reported ili above their region-specific baseline.
    • eleven states reported geographically widespread influenza activity, six states and puerto rico reported regional influenza activity, the district of columbia and 13 states reported local influenza activity, and 20 states reported sporadic influenza activity.
    national and regional summary of select surveillance components

    hhs surveillance regions*
    data for current week</strong>data cumulative for the seasonout-patient ili†% positive for flu‡number of jurisdictions reporting regional or widespread activitya (h1)a (h3)novel a (h1n1)a (could not be subyped)a(unsub-typed)bpediatric deathsnationnormal38.7 % 18 of 527,8242,17012,31642813,07910,39771region inormal38.3 % 4 of 65201511,542131,3028001region iielevated35.5 % 3 of 3277137592161,4927119region iiinormal37.5 % 3 of 61.3132131,35306691,3609region ivnormal19.7 % 2 of 8828117351411,8971,2116region vnormal52.6 % 2 of 61,6531905,7261295551,32611region vinormal14.1 % 0 of 576816589854,0792,60814region viinormal12.0 % 0 of 4498601591134505290region viiinormal29.7 % 1 of 6526216745571,5014986region ixnormal12.9 % 3 of 41,0616276802279869014region xnormal23.2 % 0 of 4380294270323366641
    * hhs regions (region i: ct, me, ma, nh, ri, vt; region ii: nj, ny, puerto rico, us virgin islands; region iii: de, dc, md, pa, va, wv; region iv: al, fl, ga, ky, ms, nc, sc, tn; region v: il, in, mi, mn, oh, wi; region vi: ar, la, nm, ok, tx; region vii: ia, ks, mo, ne; region viii: co, mt, nd, sd, ut, wy; region ix: az, ca, guam, hi, nv; and region x: ak, id, or, wa)
    † elevated means the % of visits for ili is at or above the national or region-specific baseline
    ‡ national data are for current week; regional data are for the most recent three weeks
    includes all 50 states, the district of columbia, and puerto rico
    the majority of influenza a viruses that cannot be sub-typed as seasonal influenza viruses are pandemic a (h1n1) influenza viruses upon further testing
    u.s. virologic surveillance:

    who and nrevss collaborating laboratories located in all 50 states and washington d.c. report to cdc the number of respiratory specimens tested for influenza.
    during the 2008-09 season, influenza a (h1), a (h3), and b viruses have co-circulated in the united states. on april 15 and 17, 2009, cdc confirmed the first two cases of pandemic influenza a (h1n1) virus in the united states. as of june 19, 2009, 21,449 confirmed and probable infections with pandemic influenza a (h1n1) virus and 87 deaths (24 in individuals less than 25 years and 63 deaths in adults 25 years of age older) have been identified by cdc and state and local public health departments. reporting of pandemic influenza a (h1n1) viruses by u.s. who collaborating laboratories began during week 17 (week ending may 2, 2009). the results of tests performed during the current week are summarized in the table below.
    week 23no. of specimens tested7,149no. of positive specimens (%)2,765 (38.7%)positive specimens by type/subtype influenza a2,759 (99.8%) a (pandemic h1n1) 2,263 (82.0%) a (subtyping not performed) 429 (15.5%) a (unable to subtype) 24 (0.9%) a (h3) 21 (0.8%) a (h1) 22 (0.8%) influenza b6 (0.2%)
    during week 23, seasonal influenza a (h1), a (h3), and b viruses co-circulated at low levels with pandemic influenza a (h1n1). over 98% of all subtyped influenza a viruses being reported to cdc this week were pandemic influenza a (h1n1) viruses.
    the increase in the percentage of specimens testing positive for influenza by who and nrevss collaborating laboratories may be due in part to changes in testing practices by health care providers, triaging of specimens by public health laboratories, an increase in the number of specimens collected from outbreaks, and other factors.



    view who-nrevss regional bar charts| view chart data | view full screen antigenic characterization:

    cdc has antigenically characterized 1,635 seasonal human influenza viruses [947 influenza a (h1), 171 influenza a (h3) and 517 influenza b viruses] collected by u.s. laboratories since october 1, 2008, and 144 pandemic influenza a (h1n1) viruses.
    all 947 influenza seasonal a (h1) viruses are related to the influenza a (h1n1) component of the 2008-09 influenza vaccine (a/brisbane/59/2007). all 171 influenza a (h3n2) viruses are related to the a (h3n2) vaccine component (a/brisbane/10/2007).
    all 144 pandemic influenza a (h1n1) viruses are related to the a/california/07/2009 (h1n1) reference virus selected by who as a potential candidate for pandemic influenza a (h1n1) vaccine.
    influenza b viruses currently circulating can be divided into two distinct lineages represented by the b/yamagata/16/88 and b/victoria/02/87 viruses. sixty-five influenza b viruses tested belong to the b/yamagata lineage and are related to the vaccine strain (b/florida/04/2006). the remaining 452 viruses belong to the b/victoria lineage and are not related to the vaccine strain.
    data on antigenic characterization should be interpreted with caution given that antigenic characterization data is based on hemagglutination inhibition (hi) testing using a panel of reference ferret antisera and results may not correlate with clinical protection against circulating viruses provided by influenza vaccination.
    annual influenza vaccination is expected to provide the best protection against those virus strains that are related to the vaccine strains, but limited to no protection may be expected when the vaccine and circulating virus strains are so different as to be from different lineages, as is seen with the two lineages of influenza b viruses. antigenic characterization of pandemic influenza a (h1n1) viruses indicates that these viruses are antigenically and genetically unrelated to seasonal influenza a (h1n1) viruses, suggesting that little to no protection would be expected from vaccination with seasonal influenza vaccine.
    antiviral resistance:

    since october 1, 2008, 988 seasonal influenza a (h1n1), 172 influenza a (h3n2), and 529 influenza b viruses have been tested for resistance to the neuraminidase inhibitors (oseltamivir and zanamivir). nine hundred ninety-one seasonal influenza a (h1n1) and 179 influenza a (h3n2) viruses have been tested for resistance to the adamantanes (amantadine and rimantadine). one hundred eighty-eight pandemic influenza a (h1n1) viruses have been tested for resistance to the neuraminidase inhibitors (oseltamivir and zanamivir). one hundred forty-two pandemic influenza a (h1n1) viruses have been tested for resistance to the adamantanes (amantadine and rimantadine). the results of antiviral resistance testing performed on these viruses are summarized in the table below.
    isolates tested (n)resistant viruses,
    number (%)
    isolates tested (n)resistant viruses, number (%)oseltamivirzanamiviradamantanesseasonal influenza a (h1n1)988983 (99.5%)0 (0)9916 (0.6%)influenza a (h3n2)1720 (0)0 (0)179179 (100%)influenza b5290 (0)0 (0)n/a*n/a*novel influenza a (h1n1)1880 (0)0 (0)142142 (100%) *the adamantanes (amantadine and rimantadine) are not effective against influenza b viruses.



    antiviral treatment with either oseltamivir or zanamivir is recommended for all patients with confirmed, probable or suspected cases of pandemic influenza a (h1n1) virus infection who are hospitalized or who are at higher risk for seasonal influenza complications. the pandemic influenza a (h1n1) virus is susceptible to both neuraminidase inhibitor antiviral medications zanamivir and oseltamivir. it is resistant to the adamantane antiviral medications, amantadine and rimantadine. additional information on antiviral recommendations for treatment and chemoprophylaxis of pandemic influenza a (h1n1) infection is available at http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/recommendations.htm
    in areas that continue to have seasonal influenza activity, especially those with circulation of oseltamivir-resistant seasonal human influenza a (h1n1) viruses, clinicians might prefer to use either zanamivir or a combination of oseltamivir and either rimantadine or amantadine to provide adequate empiric treatment or chemoprophylaxis for patients who might have seasonal human influenza a (h1n1) virus infection.
    pneumonia and influenza (p&i) mortality surveillance

    during week 23, 7.0% of all deaths reported through the 122-cities mortality reporting system were due to p&i. this percentage is slightly above the epidemic threshold of 6.9% for week 23.

    view full screeninfluenza-associated pediatric mortality

    one influenza-associated pediatric death was reported to cdc during week 23 (arizona). this death was associated with a pandemic influenza a (h1n1) virus infection. the death reported this week occurred during week 23 (the week ending june 13, 2009). since september 28, 2008, cdc has received 71 reports of influenza-associated pediatric deaths that occurred during the current influenza season, six of which were due to pandemic influenza a (h1n1) virus infections.
    of the 34 children who had specimens collected for bacterial culture from normally sterile sites, 14 (41.2%) were positive; staphylococcus aureus was identified in nine (64.3%) of the 14 children. one of the three children with confirmed pandemic influenza a (h1n1) infection had a specimen collected from a normally sterile site; bacterial cultures were negative. four of the s. aureus isolates were sensitive to methicillin and five were methicillin resistant. twelve (85.7%) of the 14 children with bacterial coinfections were five years of age or older and 10 (71.4%) of the 14 children were 12 years of age or older. an increase in the number of influenza-associated pediatric deaths with bacterial coinfections was first recognized during the 2006-07 influenza season. in january 2008, interim testing and reporting recommendations were released regarding influenza and bacterial coinfections in children and are available at (http://www2a.cdc.gov/han/archivesys/...alertnum=00268).

    view full screeninfluenza-associated hospitalizations

    laboratory-confirmed influenza-associated hospitalizations are monitored in two population-based surveillance networks: the new vaccine surveillance network (nvsn) and the emerging infections program (eip).
    during october 12, 2008 to may 30, 2009, the preliminary laboratory-confirmed influenza-associated hospitalization rate for children 0-4 years old in the nvsn was 3.85 per 10,000. because of case identification methods utilized in this study, there is a delay from the date of hospitalization to the date of report.

    view full screen

    during april 15, 2009 – june 13, 2009, the following preliminary laboratory-confirmed overall influenza associated hospitalization rates were reported by the eip (rates include type a, type b, and confirmed pandemic h1n1):
    rates for children aged 0-23 months, 2-4 years, and 5-17 years were 0.92, 0.22, and 0.16 per 10,000, respectively. rates for adults aged 18-49 years, 50-64 years, and = 65 years, the overall flu rates were 0.07, 0.09, and 0.23 per 10,000, respectively.

    *this value represents an age group-specific average influenza rate from october 1 to april 30 from the 2005-06, 2006-07, and 2007-08 influenza seasons.
    **note: the scales for the 0-23 month and the >= 65 years age groups differ from other age groups.

    view full screenoutpatient illness surveillance:

    nationwide during week 23, 1.8% of patient visits reported through the u.s. outpatient influenza-like illness surveillance network (ilinet) were due to influenza-like illness (ili). this percentage is below the national baseline of 2.4%.

    view ilinet regional charts | view chart data |view full screen



    on a regional level, the percentage of outpatient visits for ili ranged from 0.5% to 4.7%. one of the 10 surveillance regions reported an ili percentage above their region specific baseline (region ii). ili decreased during week 23 in six of 10 regions compared to week 22.
    geographic spread of influenza as assessed by state and territorial epidemiologists:

    the influenza activity reported by state and territorial epidemiologists indicates geographic spread of both seasonal influenza and pandemic influenza a (h1n1) viruses and does not measure the severity of influenza activity.

    during week 23, the following influenza activity was reported:
    • widespread influenza activity was reported by 11 states (arizona, connecticut, delaware, hawaii, maine, new jersey, new york, pennsylvania, rhode island, utah, and virginia).
    • regional influenza activity was reported by puerto rico and six states (california, georgia, illinois, massachusetts, minnesota, and south carolina).
    • local influenza activity was reported by the district of columbia and 13 states (alabama, colorado, maryland, michigan, new mexico, north carolina, oklahoma, tennessee, texas, vermont, west virginia, wisconsin, and wyoming).
    • sporadic activity was reported by 20 states (alaska, arkansas, florida, idaho, indiana, iowa, kansas, kentucky, louisiana, mississippi, missouri, montana, nebraska, nevada, new hampshire, north dakota, ohio, oregon, south dakota, and washington).

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    a description of surveillance methods is available at: http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/fluactivity.htm



    • page last updated june 19, 2009.

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